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Line-of-Business Reporting: A Legal Basis
J. V. Baumler*
A CURRENT TOPIC OF CONCERN to the financial accounting community
is reporting for segments of a business. If a firm is engaged in
several lines of business, as conglomerate enterprises are, should they
report the financial results of their activity merely in summary fashion
for the firm as a whole, or should financial results for the several lines
of business be disclosed as well? If some of the segments of a firm are
profitable while others are not, should this fact be disclosed? These
questions have been discussed and debated for several years. The cur-
rent debate seems to have had its origins in the anti-trust field. Former
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Manuel F.
Cohen, was the major sponsor of segment financial reporting proposals,
and his interest in the topic has been traced back to a 1965 appearance
before the Subcommittee on the Anti-Trust and Monopoly of the
United States Senate Committee on Judiciary.' Thereafter, the SEC
moved to implement segmental reporting requirements. In September
1968 the SEC issued its Proposed Rules for Disclosure by Line of
Business. 2 The business community reacted rather vigorously and the
SEC somewhat modified its requirements. 3 But its final amendments
called for disclosure of revenue and income by lines of business on the
Form 10-K filed annually with the SEC.4 This became effective with
financial statements filed with the SEC dated December 31, 1970 or
thereafter. Form 10-K, although available for public inspection and
coyping at the Commission's public reference rooms, is not widely
distributed. In a recent action, however, rules 14a-3 and 14c-3 were
changed to require that firms, in their annual reports to shareholders,
must offer to send shareholders their most recent Form 10-K, and
must also disclose within the annual report the actual breakdown of
revenues and income that is presented in Form 10-K. Specifically,
revenue and income must be disclosed for each line of business which
produced 10% (15% for smaller firms) of either before tax revenue
or income in either of the last two years. Thus, the SEC has rather
quickly moved to answer the questions with which we began, reporting
by segment is required for those firms under SEC regulation. While
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2 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8397 (Sept. 4, 1968).
3 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8530 (Feb. 18, 1969).
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the SEC has taken the lead in this area, other groups have also been
active; namely, the Federal Trade Commission and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board, and to a lesser extent the Cost Account-
ing Standards Board.
The action of the SEC has mooted, for regulated firms, the question
of whether or not an obligation existed to report a segmented earnings
statement even without administrative regulation. Some had suggested
that such an obligation did exist.6 No matter; the question is now
answered affirmatively, such reports must be prepared. One can still
consider the stimulating question of why they should be prepared and
the pragmatically important question of how they should be prepared.
It may be argued that the why and how questions should have been
definitively addressed first, but such are not always the workings of
administrative bodies. Obviously, the why question relates to the SEC's
concern with full and fair disclosure to investors. Two surveys of
investors to determine their perceived need for segmented accounting
reports have been conducted,7 but their results are far less than over-
whelming. The accounting literature is only recently beginning to
include studies as to the impact of segment reports upon users of
financial statements.8 The only safe conclusions at this time are that
although most individuals claim a preference for additional financial
information concerning firms in which they invest, the usefulness of
segmented reports to supply this information is unclear and further
research is warranted.
We are none-the-less left with the thorny question of how best
to provide segmented financial reports. The next section of this paper
will identify the major problems of implementation. Then attention
will be focused upon one of these problems and an examination will
be made of its possible resolution on a theory drawn from case law
developed in the corporate field.
Problems of Implementation
Problems of implementation have been identified in a number of
sources,' but are far from being resolved. A fundamental problem
concerns the determination of which segments are to be reported upon.
Often total corporate activity can be sliced many different ways. Con-
sider the firm producing electronic components and jet engines. Both
are sold to industrial customers and the federal government. What
are this firm's lines-of-business? Some would identify them with prod-
6 A.A. Sommer, Jr., PUBLIC REPORTING BY CONGLOMERATES, at 1-16 (1968).
7 R. Mautz, FINANCIAL REPORTING BY DIVERSIFIED COMPANIES (1968); M. Backer & W.
McFarland, EXTERNAL REPORTING FOR SEGMENTS OF A BUSINESS (1968).
8 See, e.g., Kinney, Predicting Earnings: Entity Versus Subentity Data, 9 J. ACCOUNTING
RESEARCH 127 (1971).
9 See, e.g., Sprouse, supra note 1; D. Solomons, DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE: MEASURE-




ucts, others with customers. How about an integrated steel company,
is coal transport a separate line-of-business? Consider a TV network,
is it in both the businesses of entertainment and education? Identifica-
tion of the lines of business is less than straightforward for virtually
any large-scale complex enterprise. To date, the practice of line-of-
business identification has been quite inconsistent. One researcher has
concluded that no single basis of classification exists which could be
utilized by all diversified firms and that considerable flexibility is
required in identification of lines-of-business. ° It is probably fair to
say that the SEC has been inclined to accept whatever categorization
the reporting companies decide upon.
Given a definition of the lines-of-business engaged in, the next issue
concerns the degree of detail required in reporting the financial per-
formance of these segments. As a minimum the revenues and income
of these segments must be reported, but in how much detail can and
should costs be reported? Should assets and liabilities be divided
between lines-of-business? In practice the approach has generally
been an aggregation of cost data and a failure to apportion assets and
liabilities. This tactic makes impossible return on investment analysis
by line-of-business.
A major conceptual problem is how to apportion the firm's revenues
and expenses between segments. It is this problem for which we will
seek at least a partial solution out of the legal environment.
Fortunately, for most firms, revenues derived from ultimate sale
of goods or services to customers are readily identifiable with a
segment. But not so with the allocation of common costs. Nor is the
split of revenues and costs clear with regard to transactions between
segments. Let's look at a couple of illustrations to highlight the pro-
blems. The corporate headquarters for a diversified firm provides
support activities for the various divisions. For simplicity, these
divisions each are considered separate lines of business. They utilize
corporate support activities to various extents. Corporate support
activities include a legal department, a research center, a labor rela-
tions office and a computer service center. How should the costs of
these corporate support activities be apportioned among the divisions?
This is a problem that cost accountants have concerned themselves with
for decades, and the only answer thus far developed is that costs will
be apportioned to the divisions in some reasonable but arbitrary fash-
ion. We have considered the simple case where the lines of business
are synonomous with the divisions. When lines of business represent
some combination of divisional activities, the common costs of cor-
porate support activities would undoubtedly be arbitrarily allocated
"'Mautz, Bases for More Detailed Reporting by Diversified Companies, FINANCIAL EX1CU-
TIVE, at 52 (1967).
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first to the divisions and then to the lines of business. How are such
arbitrary allocations to be made? No satisfactory answer exists. What
might the impact of these allocations be? They could determine which
lines of business report a profit and which report a loss. Do we really
serve the investment community by requiring line-of-business report-
ing when the end result is merely the product of some arbitrary and
unknown cost allocation scheme?
A related problem exists when products are transferred between
segments. Segment A buys components from Segment B. In order to
prepare financial reports for each segment these components must
be priced. By pricing them high, profit can be transferred from Seg-
ment A to Segment B. By pricing them low, profit can be transferred
the other way. Transfer pricing is a classic accounting problem, but
for this purpose no definitive price exists.
The real danger is that by manipulating cost allocations and
transfer prices, the reporting firm can produce the line of business
profitability measures it desires. Without some mechanism for evalu-
ating these practices, the validity of line-of-business reports must be
questioned.
We cannot realistically look to the certified public accountant to
quickly remedy this situation. Accounting procedures have been geared
to assessing reporting practices of the firm as a whole and measuring
income of the total entity, except in one rather notable exception -
and this exception has produced considerable litigation and a definitive
body of law. We will use this exception to seek a standard, a legal
standard, for cost allocations and transfer prices.
Segmented financial reports have long been prepared when the
segments are separate legal entities. The analogy we seek is a virtually
wholly owned subsidiary, but one in which a minority stockholder in-
terest exists. There are many such corporations, the largest probably
being Western Electric, Inc.; the manufacturing and supply arm of the
Bell System. It is an integral part of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Corporation, but as a "line-of-business" it has been separ-
ately reported for years. It must be admitted that some may question
the validity of these reports. It has often been charged that too much
profit has been associated with this non-price regulated segment of
AT&T. Obviously, the transfer price of telephone equipment greatly
determines Western Electric profit. But the dealings between inter-
related corporations with minority stockholder interests is not strictly
the province of corporate management. A standard of law exists.
Establishing a Legal Standard
To facilitate the establishment of a legal standard we will strike an
analogy. Assume that in lieu of line of business segments we have a




totally by the parent corporation-in-chief. Assume further that each
of these entities has minority ownership" as well as interlocking
directorates. When line-of-business reports are prepared we might
ask: did the directors properly adhere to their fiduciary duties with
respect to factors affecting corporate profit - we will impute full
knowledge of cost allocations and transfer prices. Similarly, when
goods or services are transferred between the parent and subsidiary
corporation in our analogy, we might ask: was the conduct of the
common directors in regard to the pricing of goods and services in
keeping with their fiduciary obligations to the subsidiary corporation.
The standards used is assessing the latter situation should provide
the necessary framework for examining the former.
We turn now to the standards of conduct required of the common
directors in our analogy.
In interpreting the broad duties of corporate management the
courts have focused on management's having acted intra vires, 12 having
exercised due care, 3 and having observed the requisite fiduciary
duties. 14 It is the effects of the latter upon our situation with which
we are concerned. A survey of the case law leaves little doubt that
directors are in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation. In the words
of a leading case, the director
owes loyalty and allegiance to the company - a loyalty that is
undivided and an allegiance that is influenced in action by
no consideration other than the welfare of the corporation.
Any adverse interest of a director will be subjected to a
scrutiny rigid and uncomproming1 s
In practice a similar situation does occasionally occur. An example might be Ling-Temco-
Vought, Inc.
12 There are two views concerning the liability of directors for loss to their corporation from
an ultra vires transaction: 1) absolute liability, see W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 1021-28, (Rev. vol. 1965); and 2) liability for
negligence, see Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
13Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1963);
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Several states have imposed a statutory
duty. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1408 (1967). See also Adkins and Janis, Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate
Directors, 20 Bus. LAW. 817 (1965) (recent survey of corporation laws indicated ten
states with statutes in this area).
14 Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 411 P.2d 921 (1966) (director's conduct
of inducing corporate personnel to join competing corporation found to violate fiduciary
duty); Bennett v. Prop, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (use of corporate
funds to purchase corporate shares for purpose of maintaining control by dominating
director and his fellow directors is a breach of fiduciary duty); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del.
Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939) (corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use
their position of trust to further their own interest).
"s Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-78 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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Hence, in a situation where goods and services are transferred
between the corporation-in-chief and its subsidiary, and inappropriate
prices are accepted by the directors of the subsidiary, the validity of
the transaction can be challenged by minority shareholders. Thus we
approach the gravamen of our problem, by what standard do we
measure director conduct in the context of a transaction between
corporations with interlocking directorates.
Early case law in this area was guided by an inflexible rule adopted
from the English courts. Under this view transactions between a
director and his corporation, and thus by analogy between corpora-
tions with common directors, was voidable by the corporation regard-
less of its fairness. 6 This rule, however, exacerbated the difficulties
of major corporations dealing in a modern industrialized society, 7
and had the further effect of imposing a fiduciary obligation on
coporate directors equivalent to that of agents or trustees. '
As a result, the law underwent a rapid evolution, and today the
majority of jurisdictions consider the establishment of "fairness"
to the corporation sufficient to validate the transaction where dis-
interested directors have indicated their approval. 9 In the case of
interlocking directorates, this rule has been further liberalized to
require merely a showing of fairness; i.e., would an independent
corporate fiduciary in an arm's length bargain bind his corporation
to such a transaction.2 .
An important aspect of this fairness test concerns the burden of
proof. Essentially three views exist. The prevailing view, as enunciated
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co.,21 is that the party seeking to uphold the transaction must establish
16 The court in Reinhardt v. Owensboro Planing Mill Co., 185 Ky. 600, 603, 215 S.W. 523,
524 (1919) observed that
[dlirectors are bound to exercise nothing short of the uberrima fides of the civil
law. They must not in any degree allow their official conduct to be swayed by
their interest or welfare, unless that interest be one they have in the good of
the company in common with all of the stockholders.
17 Alabama Fidelity Mortgage & Bond Co. v. Dubberly, 198 Ala. 545, 73 So. 911 (1916);
O'Conner Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Coosa Furnace Co., 95 Ala. 614, 10 So. 290 (1891);
Glengary Consol. Mining Co. v. Boehmer, 28 Colo. 1, 62 P. 839 (1900); Fitzgerald v.
Fitzgerald & Mallory Constr. Co., 44 Neb. 463, 62 N.W. 899 (1895).
18 See generally Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARV. L. REV. 521 (1936).
19 See N. LATTIN, R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS
623 (2d ed. 1968). See generally Baumhart, How Ethical are Business Men?, 39 HARv.
Bus. REV. 16 (1961); Thanhouser, The Corporate Counsel's Viewpoint, 17 BUS. LAW.
79 (1961); Wadmond, Conflicts of Business Interest, 17 Bus. LAw. 48 (1961).
2°Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955); Chelrob, Inc.
v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944). For a good review of the development
of the law in this area see Marsh, Are Directors Trustees: Conflicts of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 BuS. LAw. 35 (1966).




its fairness.22 A second view requires the party seeking to avoid the
transaction to show its unfairness.23 While the third view provides that
the party seeking to avoid the transaction has the burden of producing
evidence of unfairness, at which point the burden of going forward
shifts to the opposing party to show that the transaction was fair.
24
Regarless of the burden of proof involved, however, the courts
have uniformly held that transactions between corporations with
interlocking directorates are to be subjected to close judicial scrutiny
in order to determine their fairness.25 Hence, we see emerging a legal
doctrine of fairness relating to the critical accounting decisions which
apportion income between two closely related corporations when the
interests of minority shareholders are involved.
It is suggested that this same doctrine of fairness be used to test
the validity of line-of-business reports. The case law from which this
doctrine developed has grown out of factual situations which might
2 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp.,
228 F.2d 85 (2d Cit. 1955). The Geddes Court noted that
[t)he relationship of directors to corporations is of such a fiduciary nature that
transactions between boards having common members are regarded as jealously
by the law as are personal dealings between a director and his corporation, and
where the fairness of such transactions is challenged the burden is upon those
who would maintain them to show their entire fairness and where a sale is
involved the full adequacy of the consideration.
254 U.S. at 599.
2 Wentz v. Scott, 10 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1926) (there exists no presumption that the com-
mon directors will deal unfairly, and in the absence of evidence tending to show fraud,
there is a presumption of honest action); Frank H. Buck Co. v. Tuxedo Land Co., 109
Cal. App. 453, 293 P. 122 (1930); San Diego, O.T. & P.B.R. Co. v. Pacific Beach Co.,
112 Cal. 53, 44 P. 333 (1896); Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398,
8 N.E.2d 895 (1937); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942).
24Mayflower Hotel Stockholders v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 73 F.Supp. 721 (D.C. 1947),
rev'd, 173 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The court noted at 724:
I do not conceive that the phrase, sometimes somewhat loosely used, that such
a contract (between corporations with an interlocking directorate) is presumed
to be fraudulent, means that a minority stockholder is authorized to bring suit
to set the contract aside merely on the allegation that the parties to the contract
have interlocking directors and that the plaintiff is thereupon in a position to
call upon the parties to the contract to justify their good faith. I am not aware
of any case that holds such an extreme proposition. My view of the law is that
what is intended by these expressions is that much less evidence will be required
to establish a prime facie case and to shift the burden of proof on the question of
fraud than would otherwise be the case, if it appears that interlocking directorates
exist, rather than that the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case merely by
showing the presence of interlocking directors.
See Ward, Some Notes on Transactions Involving Interested and Interlocking Directors
in Pennsylvania, 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 107 (1949), wherein the author takes the stand that
the final view in reality includes the first two in that often courts are facing facts which
show uncontrovertedly that one corporation made an unusual profit at the expense of the
other. See also Cleary v. Higley, 154 Misc. 158, 277 N.Y.S. 63 (1934), aff'd, 246 App.
Div. 698 (1934).
25Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S.
483,492 (1919). The Pepper Court noted:
Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where
any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the
burden is on the director or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of
the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of
the corporation and those interested therein.
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not be readily applicable to firms which must now prepare line-of-
business financial statements. But both the law and accountants have
long recognized and utilized entity concepts more meaningful than
mere legal entities. Consolidated financial statements are obvious
examples. A similar fiction should be utilized in this instance.
A line-of-business, however defined, is to be conceptualized as a
separate corporation, fully controlled, but with a minority share-
holders' interest. By using this device, the doctrine of fairness will
be called into play. An important related question, but one beyond
the scope of this comment, would be how would the reader of a seg-
mented financial statement know if the standard of fairness had been
met. Without really addressing this question, we can speculate as to
two possible answers. One would require that the corporation, its
officers or directors, must assert in their segmented financial state-
ments that the standard of fairness had been met. Alternatively, it
could be attested to by an independent outside professional expert, a
role which neither attorneys nor accountants would find foreign to
their practice.
Conclusion
Some might seek a more definitive solution to the financial report-
ing problems discussed. Unfortunately, they probably do not exist. For
those who might feel that superior reporting practices should be de-
manded, it is important to note that firms need not go beyond the
procedures suggested. Virtually any firm could create actual corpora-
tions which exactly parallel the analogous corporations we have
posited. Based on the level of reporting now undertaken it is quite
clear that income statements for these new corporate entities would
fully satisfy SEC Rule 13a-1, and that the legal fairness standard
discussed above would be totally appropriate. It seems unreasonable to
ask a firm to do more merely due to the happenstance of organizational
form. One should not be prohibited from doing indirectly that which it
may do directly. Thus we argue that the legal standard of fairness,
although at times ill-defined, represents both the maximum standard
which logically should be imposed and the minimum standard we
could accept.
[Vol. 24:215
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